Vietnam -'I won't tell you how to run Malaysia, and you don't tell us how to run Vietnam' was theatrical -it was his message regarding the British plans for withdrawal from East of Suez sent on 11 January 1968 which was the more emotive. 5 'I cannot conceal from you my deep dismay upon learning this profoundly discouraging news', he wrote. 'If these steps are taken, they will be tantamount to British withdrawal from world affairs, with all that means for the future safety and health of the free world. The structure of peace-keeping will be shaken to its foundations. Our own capability and political will could be gravely weakened if we have to man the ramparts all alone.' 6 Against the backdrop of these momentous events, it is perhaps not surprising that resolution 242 and the diplomacy which surrounded it have drawn rather less attention from scholars of British policy and Anglo-American relations in the Middle East. 7 In so far as it has been treated in this historiography resolution 242 has tended to be seen as an example of Anglo-American cooperation. Indeed the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur
Goldberg, went so far as to claim that the US delegation was primarily responsible for the wording of the British draft and for the leg-work of recommending it in national capitals. 8 The British role under this interpretation was essentially one of taking over an American initiative in the final stages of the negotiations and effectively resolving the remaining minor semantic disputes. This conjures up the image of a sort of diplomatic relay race, with the United States passing the baton of resolution 242 to Britain on the final leg, with the latter charged merely with running it over the line for victory from a commanding position. The argument here will illuminate the path to the passing of resolution 242 in terms of Minister Wilson', Rostow wrote. 30 Given that the Administration was supposed to be cooperating with the British in organising the convoying of ships through the Straits this was an extraordinary omission.
The nuances of British and American policy in the region were of little concern to the Arab states as the extent of their defeat became apparent early in the ensuing war. Both
Britain and the United States were unjustly tarred with the same brush of the so called "Big Lie", the claim, which appears to have originated in a telephone exchange between King
Hussein of Jordan and President Nasser in the early hours 6 June, that they had participated in the Israeli air assault on the opening day of the war. 31 While King Hussein publicly retracted the claim on American television on 27 June, the damage had already been done in terms of Arab public opinion. 32 The "Big Lie" formed part of what was an unpromising backdrop for post-war British and American diplomacy over the Arab-Israeli conflict.
In the wake of the formal ceasefires on the battlefield, efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict focused on the United Nations. With the Security Council divided, the Soviet Union instead requested an Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly which convened on 17 June. This Soviet move was seen in
London and Washington as a device to transfer debate to a forum more likely to be 12 sympathetic to the position of the Arab states. Anglo-American differences in approach soon became apparent during this special session of the General Assembly and focused initially on the principles outlined in a speech given by British Foreign Secretary George Brown.
Brown's speech to the General Assembly on 21 June touched on two points which were controversial to the extent that they were unwelcome to the Israeli government and to a large degree to the Johnson Administration. The first concerned the inadmissibility under the UN Charter of territorial gains made by conquest. The second concerned the status of Jerusalem. 33 On both issues Brown went further than the Johnson Administration would have liked. 34 As Sir Leslie Glass, a senior member of the British delegation to the UN noted, the East affairs, later recollected that on the plane over to New York, Brown was unhappy with the anodyne draft for his speech prepared by the Foreign Office and demanded a re-draft with 'more life in it'. Specifically, he instructed Brenchley to strengthen the sections on the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by conquest and of any Israeli actions to change the status of Jerusalem. This was despite the fact that Brenchley warned him these changes would produce 'a speech highly objectionable to the Israelis'. 36 Specifically, on withdrawal, Brown was unequivocal: 'I see no two ways about this, and I state our position very clearly.
In my view, from the words in the Charter, war should not lead to territorial aggrandisement.'
On Jerusalem, he addressed the Israeli Government even more directly: 'I call on the State of Israel not to take any steps in relation to Jerusalem which would conflict with this principle. I say very solemnly to the Government of Israel that, if they purport to annex the Old City or legislate for its annexation, they will be taking a step which will not only isolate them from world opinion, but will also lose them the sympathy that they have.' 37 As Brenchley noted,
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Brown was calling unequivocally on the Israelis to withdraw from all the territory they had occupied, including East Jerusalem. As Brown left the Assembly there was time for one more moment of drama. By chance, and somewhat to his own consternation, Brown immediately ran into the Israeli delegation which included Golda Meir, one of the Israeli friends Brown had made through his attendance at meetings of the Socialist International. Brenchley, who was at his side, noted that without a moment's hesitation Brown went over to kiss Golda Meir on the cheek, an act of courage in itself. 'I was the only other member of the British delegation close enough to hear her one-word comment', Brenchley later recollected, 'which interestingly was "Judas"'. Brown said nothing in reply. 38 Brown's blunt approach on the question of Israeli withdrawal stood in marked contrast to the more circumspect line adopted by President Johnson, who had outlined five principles for peace in the Middle East in a speech delivered in Washington DC rather than at the UN in New York on 19 June. 39 The first and most important was that 'every nation in the area has a fundamental right to live, and to have this right respected by its neighbours.' The second was 'justice for the refugees'. The third was respect for maritime rights. The fourth was the danger presented by the Middle East arms race which he proposed might be controlled by all UN members reporting arms shipments to the region. The fifth was the 'importance of respect for political independence and territorial integrity of all the states of the area.' All nations in the region needed 'recognized boundaries and other arrangements that will give them security against terror, destruction, and war.' On Jerusalem, Johnson called merely for 'adequate recognition of the special interest of three great religions in the holy places of Jerusalem.' 40 The question of withdrawal was addressed only indirectly through the references to territorial integrity for all states and the need for recognized boundaries.
The Anglo-American differences signalled by Brown's and Johnson's speeches became more fully apparent as the question of the status of Jerusalem moved to the forefront 14 of debate at the special General Assembly session at the beginning of July. This followed the approval by the Israeli Knesset on 27 June of three bills authorising the extension of Israeli law and administration to occupied Arab territory which fell within the borders of the former Palestine mandate. Under the auspices of this general enabling legislation Israel issued a decree extending Israeli law to East Jerusalem. 41 While both Washington and London took the public stance that the Israeli action was illegal under international law, and that as an expressing the 'deepest regret and concern' at Israel's non-compliance and stating that the General Assembly 'deplores the failure of Israel to implement General Assembly resolution 2253'. 43 The forceful wording of the resolution brought Anglo-American differences even more to the fore. In a discussion between Caradon and Goldberg, the US Ambassador made it clear that any resolution which included condemnation of Israel should be ruled out. Burns about the report, he was told that the King had not in fact indicated that it was his definite intention to enter into secret talks with the Israelis if no progress was made at the UN, but rather that there was a possibility he might feel himself forced to take that step.
Given Rostow's earlier attempts to promote such covert talks, this misrepresentation was more likely a deliberate rather than an accidental misreading of the report from Amman. 65 At any rate, it served once again to highlight the confusion surrounding US policy-making from the British perspective.
If Gene Rostow's encouragement of covert Israeli-Jordanian talks, which were likely to be an unproductive and insubstantial exercise in prevarication, was one illustration of a pro-Israel bias in US policy-making at this juncture, at the UN, Ambassador Goldberg's footdragging over further moves to promote a Security Council resolution during September and
October was a further such illustration. Goldberg's approach was an additional source of tension in Anglo-American relations. Both Caradon and Dean believed that Goldberg had adopted a consistently pessimistic attitude about the chances of making progress and that his own preference was for 'not taking initiatives and for letting events take their course'.
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However, the British continued to hope that despite Goldberg's political influence and his direct access to the president, Secretary of State Dean Rusk's views, which they saw as being closer to their own, might prevail over the framing of a Security Council resolution.
Nevertheless, it would be an unwarranted over-simplification of US policy-making to suggest that Goldberg and Gene Rostow were both reading from the same script sympathetic to the Israeli position, while Rusk followed another line, more similar to that of the British government. The confusion on the US side was such that although both Goldberg and Rostow probably did entertain the same underlying pro-Israel sympathies, there was frequently To help assuage Hussein's doubts, Jack O'Connell, the CIA station chief in Amman and a qualified international lawyer, who had been drafted to Goldberg's staff to act as a gobetween to the King, now prepared a formal document which confirmed that 'the United
States is prepared to support a return of the West Bank to Jordan with minor boundary rectifications.' 77 The King asked for assurances that the US would implement this commitment from Goldberg, Rusk and the President in turn. 78 However, he evidently remained unconvinced by their responses, not least by the President's observation that 'it was difficult to be precise in one part and not on the others. There were imprecise statements in the resolution in several respects.' 79 For his part the King pointed out that if he were to support the US resolution, he would be sacrificing 'the previous Arab insistence on certain resolution language which they felt protected their position in return for a promise from the
Evidently, the trust in US intentions needed for King Hussein to make this leap of faith was lacking. This issue of trust, more than the semantics of the wording on withdrawal, was the key reason why King Hussein did not signal his acceptance of the US draft. In the background, Caradon, an interlocutor whom the King did trust, was now working to clarify the as yet still private UK text in ways which might attract the King. These encompassed the separation of the withdrawal provision from the 'peace' provision in the text, and the addition of the words 'occupied in the recent conflict' to specify from which territories withdrawal should take place. His purpose as outlined to Foreign Secretary Brown was 'to ensure that our 23 new draft cannot be claimed as simply the American draft in a different guise'. 81 Caradon recognised that launching this UK initiative would make Goldberg, who had staked his personal prestige on securing the passage of the US resolution, 'a good deal upset'. However, he argued that 'I think I know him well enough to explain to him very frankly that we must have a line of our own'. 82 Apart from any other consideration the choice between backing the US resolution or the non-aligned/Indian resolution would create a difficult dilemma for the British government. The Indian draft was in fact closer to the British position but voting for it, or even abstaining if it came to a vote, would constitute a significant snub to the United States. 105 In the end, when the resolution came to a vote on 22 November, all fifteen hands, or more accurately fourteen hands and Kuznetsov's index finger, were raised in favour of the British resolution. 106 The Soviet vote, according to Caradon, was 'an act of political courage' largely attributable to Kuznetsov's work. 107 Caradon's view was that it was Kuznetsov's personal intervention which had ultimately led to the withdrawal of the Soviet resolution and the vote in favour of the British resolution. 108 In Washington, less favourable interpretations of Soviet actions were circulating to the effect that the Soviets had only backed down when it became clear that Nasser was willing to accept the British resolution. 109 One way or another, relations with the Arab states were most likely at the core of Soviet diplomacy over the Security Council resolution. Whether or not the Soviet leadership misjudged the degree of Arab flexibility, it is clear that for political purposes they wanted to have on record a draft resolution which re- Henceforth it would be the United States which would act as the principal external sponsor of the peace process. In that sense it is no small irony that resolution 242 was passed almost precisely half a century after the promulgation of the Balfour Declaration in November 1917. 
